This paper discusses the problems and dangers of proceeding with European integration without facing a transparent constitutional debate. The crucial issue demanding clarity is whether the current integration in the form of the EU shall be seen within the 
INTRODUCTION
, its failure also led to the disappearance of the explicit principle. The Lisbon Treaty returns to the previous silence of the treaties, adding however a declaration (declaration No 17) on supremacy which simply recalls the relevant consistent jurisprudence of the Court and which extends the principle to the Union -as opposed to the Community -law. Nevertheless and despite that the question of supremacy of EU law is largely well known and understood, the issue of the relationship between the constitutions of the Member States and EU law poses different and more complex questions. This is due to two factors. First, the fact that constitutions are the keys to EU membership and the mechanisms for allowing a state to join such a Union as the EU and therefore, given the current nature of the EU, the factor that provides and to some extent checks Union legitimacy. Secondly, there is the essential role of constitutions in protecting the fundamental rights of individuals. The question of relationship between a legal instrument with such a special role and another legal system such as EU law poses challenges of a different nature than the relationship between regular legislation of the Member States and EU law.
Even if supremacy of EU law as a concept is well known, this concept has been created without a thorough debate about the process of "constitutionalisation" of the Union. This may not be a problem in relation to clearly defined areas of law that are explicitly delegated to the EU, but as the areas of application of EU law grow, various issues linked to basic principles of democratic systems, like the rule of law, become ever more relevant. In such contexts it is important to be clear on how EU primary and secondary legislation interrelates with national constitutions and how conflicts between the supranational and the national legal systems can and should be resolved. There are different ways to look at the relationship between EU law and national law of the Member States, but in any case it is not a consistent, ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 6, NUMBER 1 2013
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hierarchical system like that of a state. Supremacy of EU law is one aspect of the system, but without at the same time considering factors such as which areas are regulated by EU law at all, how national constitutions -and not least the protection of fundamental rights -fit into the EU legal system and the obligations Member
States and/or the EU have under public international law, the mere invocation of supremacy does not provide a full answer to the question of the legal order in the EU.
As already noted, the supremacy of Community law has been repeatedly asserted by the ECJ in various rulings already from the 1960s, the case Costa vs.
ENEL 3 being one of the first and most important ones. In 1970 the ECJ went as far as to affirm that Community law had superior force over even constitutional provisions. 4 Despite the constant, even though prudent position of the ECJ over this latter issue, it is obvious that conflicts between the constitution of a Member State and EU law cannot -and indeed should not -be solved by the blanket subordination of one legal order to another. This is not suitable in order to deal with the complexity of the relationship between different legal orders in the EU of today.
Moreover, even the ECJ has recognized that different legal orders are not hierarchical but that the relationship between them is based on different criteria. 
THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
One main issue on which clarity is needed is whether European integration in the form of the EU shall be seen within the framework and concepts of public international law or within those of constitutional law. This is not just an academic answer also to the question of whether a hierarchical system of norms with constitutional controls built into the system or a flexible system with deliberative constitutionalism is the way forward for the EU.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, LEADING TO

STATE-BUILDING
The motive for European integration after the Second World War was predominantly to avoid the possibility of any future war among the European states that joined the integration system (excluding East and Central Europe then under Soviet dominance). The shape of integration was fashioned around this general objective, which in practice led to different integration alternatives, like the Council 
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Interpretation by the ECJ has allowed taking into consideration the spirit of the treaties. 18 With such interpretation methods it has been possible for the ECJ to be dynamic and find relevant meanings to terms and concepts even when the treaties have been incomplete. This is the kind of ECJ activity that has led to claims of excessive judicial activism. A wider interpretation is however not the same as judicial activism, as long as it is foreseen in the treaties and as long as it is within the competence given to the Court in such treaties. It is instead a way for the Court to be able to properly fulfil its role as the final interpreter of EU law and to ensure that there is no situation of non licet.
This said, especially in light of such wider, functional interpretations, the possibility to foresee the content of EU law is different from that common to continental legal systems based primarily on written laws. This is a challenge for national constitutional courts, which must determine the risk for violations of constitutional principles based on the spirit of the Treaties in addition to the letter of them (and secondary legislation).
In the Schmidberger case 19 
THE EU AS A RECHTSSTAAT
The EU undoubtedly has brought change to the traditional structure of international law, as integration in the EU goes much further than any other regional integration system or international organisation. 21 Joining the EU is a voluntary act and in that respect is no different than traditional international law, 25 It is no coincidence that the first case on the supremacy of EU law over constitutional provisions (the above mentioned Internationale Handelsgesellschaft dealt in fact with fundamental rights and specified that "respect for human rights is an integral part of the general principles of law whose respect the Court ensures" and that, in order for the Court to determine the content of these rights it should draw from "the constitutional traditions common to member states" (Internationale Handelsgesellshaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, supra note 4). 
THE NEED FOR A TOTAL LOOK AT THE STATE-BUILDING EXERCISES OF THE EU
The gradual surrender of Member State competence to the EU level never did take the shape of constitutional debate, but, instead, more that of technical modification, in a "salami" manner of one small(ish) bit after the other-rather than as a consistent debate.
As an example, one of the most significant federal measures, a monetary 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
The absence of a coherent constitutional debate on the development of the EU leads to the danger of evacuating democracy and significantly endangers the concept of national demos. The EU may develop rather well even without a proper debate. The silence of the political debate on Europe was deliberate and in some respects useful as it allowed for the gradual construction of significant power, but on the other hand it hid the real nature of the European process, which can no longer be kept under the cape of international law but should be seen for what it really is: a state building process and therefore a constitutional law enterprise.
It is time that the debate about Europe takes its natural ground and that the debate is tackled head-on and in its totality. This is risky as it may well lead to questioning many aspects of the EU and for various reasons only remotely linked to the EU as such, people in Member States may be very negative towards the EU. It is the setting of economic and financial crisis in many Member States and affecting the Euro-zone as a whole that have highlighted the need for a consistent debate, but these same crises may mean that the debate will be very tough.
Delaying it yet again and continuing to just discuss current, limited questions, one-by-one, looks easier but that is a short-sighted view.
People who vote for a politician of a certain political colour and expect that politician to deliver on his or her promises, find more and more often that the policy decisions are instead made somewhere else and the politician is reduced to implementing the details of a policy decided at a different level. This level is far removed from the people of the Member States not just by the absence of a direct vote for the policy makers and physical distance but also by a lack of common knowledge and understanding of such a level.
The authors do not want to argue for "less Europe" as indeed in many areas 
